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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper began as a reflection on the Supreme Court of Canada‟s 
decision in R. v. B. (D.),
1
 in particular its finding that a presumption of 
reduced moral blameworthiness for adolescents was a principle of 
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms
2
 in the context of Canada‟s youth criminal justice system. 
The discussion points raised by the Court‟s characterization of 
adolescence, or the “constitutionalization of adolescence” as Professor 
Nicholas Bala describes it,
3
 included at the time the nature of the criteria 
established by the Court as to what constitutes a principle of fundamental 
justice, as well as concern about the implications of the decision on a 
pending case which also focused on the nature of adolescent decision-
making in the child health and welfare context: C. (A.) v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services).
4
 This paper now expands upon 
those initial comments by following upon the release of the Court‟s 
decision in C. (A.) v. Manitoba and addresses the evidentiary aspects of 
the Court‟s judicial notice of the psychological underpinnings of its 
                                                                                                             
* LL.B., M.S.W., Executive Director of the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights, 
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto and counsel for the intervenor Justice for Children and Youth 
in both R. v. B. (D.) and C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services). This is an 
updated version of a presentation at the Annual Constitutional Law Conference of Osgoode Hall 
Law School, April 17, 2009. 
1 [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3 Nicholas Bala, “R. v. B. (D.): The Constitutionalization of Adolescence” (2009) 47 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 211. 
4 [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, 2009 SCC 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C. (A.) v. Manitoba”]. 
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decision in both cases in addition to an analysis of how the Court applies 
the criteria to establish what is a principle of fundamental justice in these 
two cases. Ultimately, both cases establish a relatively consistent view of 
adolescence as a trajectory toward adulthood, but not quite there yet, and 
limits autonomous rights and adult responsibility accordingly. Arguably, 
the Court is less consistent in its application of the legal rules to arrive at 
this conclusion. 
II. STATUTORY TREATMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE AS ADULTS 
The Canadian criminal justice system‟s response to young people 
who commit the most serious violent offences has always allowed for the 
treatment of some young people as adults, either in the trial proceedings 
or in sentencing. The age at which adult treatment has been applicable 
has fluctuated over the years, but the availability of life sentences for 
murder, for example, has always been part of the juvenile justice system. 
In the past youth have been subjected to both a trial in the adult system 
as well as the possibility of an adult sentence. Under the Juvenile 
Delinquents Act,
5
 young people were treated like adults automatically at 
age 16 with the possibility of such treatment at age 14. Under the Young 
Offenders Act,
6
 youth aged 16 and older could be subjected to an adult 
trial. 
The Youth Criminal Justice Act,
7
 enacted to replace the YOA, 
established a new procedure for the treatment of young offenders as 
adults in the case of specified serious criminal offences. Whereas under 
the YOA the young person was subjected to a transfer hearing prior to 
trial to determine whether he or she would be tried in adult court, under 
the YCJA the determination takes place following the trial in youth court 
and, therefore, on the basis of a finding of guilt.
8
 The YCJA also 
established a presumption in favour of adult sentences for young people 
14 years or older for certain violent offences, called presumptive 
offences. The offences include murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, 
aggravated sexual assault and a third conviction for a serious violent 
offence (“three strikes”).9 It is up to the young person to seek a youth 
sentence in those circumstances. 
                                                                                                             
5 R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3. 
6 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 [hereinafter “YOA”]. 
7 S.C. 2002, c. 1 [hereinafter “YCJA”]. 
8 Id., s. 71. 
9 Id., s. 2(1). 
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The various transfer provisions of the previous legislation were 
subjected to Supreme Court scrutiny, but had never been subjected to a 
challenge under the Charter. In R. v. M. (S.H.),
10
 the Court examined the 
nature of the onus on a party seeking transfer to an adult court under the 
YOA. No Charter issues were raised, and McLachlin J. (as she then was) 
held that it was not a heavy burden on the Crown. Thus, when the 
government of Quebec brought a reference to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal on the constitutionality of the new provisions of the YCJA that 
Court was not bound by earlier precedent in respect of the treatment of 
youth as adults in our criminal justice system.
11
 The Court struck down 
the provision, finding that it breached the young person‟s rights under 
section 7 of the Charter contrary to the principles of fundamental justice 
that it defined as follows: 
Young offenders must be dealt with separately from adults; 
Rehabilitation, rather than suppression and dissuasion, must be at the 
heart of legislative and judicial intervention with young persons; 
The justice system for minors must limit the disclosure of the minor‟s 
identity so as to prevent stigmatization that can limit rehabilitation; 
It is imperative that the justice system for minors consider the best 
interests of the child.
12
 
The federal government chose not to appeal this decision, announcing 
that it intended to amend the legislation to align it appropriately with the 
Charter.
13
 This was never done, and the constitutionality of these sections 
of the YCJA remained live issues in the other provinces. In Ontario, the 
case of R. v. B. (D.) was the first to address the issue and essentially 
followed the reasoning of the Quebec Court of Appeal. However, there 
had been intervening decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada as to the 
definition of a principle of fundamental justice and more importantly as 
to the finding that the legal principle of the “best interests of the child” 
was not such a principle.
14
 Following on the heels of R. v. B. (D.) was R. 
                                                                                                             
10 [1989] S.C.J. No. 93, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 446 (S.C.C.). 
11 Reference re Bill C-7 respecting the criminal justice system for young persons, [2003] 
Q.J. No. 2850, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Quebec Reference”]. 
12 Id., at para. 215. 
13 37th Parliament, Official Report of Debates (Hansard) 100 (May 12, 2003), at 1450 
(Hon. Martin Cauchon). 
14 R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian 
Foundation”]. 
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v. T. (K.D.),
15
 a decision in British Columbia which came to opposite 
conclusions. In Ontario the Attorney General appealed the decision to the 
Supreme Court of Canada to finally obtain clarity in the law, something 
that the federal Department of Justice had neglected to do in the Quebec 
Reference case. 
III. R. V. B. (D.) 
D.B. was 17 years old at the time of the incident that resulted in his 
being found guilty of manslaughter. In what appeared to be an 
unprovoked attack, D.B. punched R. and knocked him unconscious. By 
the time paramedics arrived R. had no vital signs and D.B. had fled the 
scene. He was arrested the following morning at a friend‟s house. He 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a “presumptive offence”, and challenged 
the constitutionality of the “onus provisions” in the presumptive offences 
regime relying upon the reasoning of the Quebec Court of Appeal in 
Quebec Reference. The trial judge allowed the challenge on the same 
grounds as the Quebec Court of Appeal and sentenced D.B. to the 
maximum youth sentence that included an intensive rehabilitative 
custody and supervision order for a period of three years. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision but being bound by 
the Supreme Court‟s decision in Canadian Foundation for Children, 
Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General),
16
 held that the best 
interests test was not a principle of fundamental justice.
17
 Instead the 
Court found the presumption was contrary to the principle of fundamental 
justice that young offenders should be dealt with separately and not as 
adults (one of the principles enunciated by the Quebec Court of Appeal) 
as well as the principle that the Crown must bear the burden of proving 
aggravating factors in seeking a harsher sentence for the accused.
18
 The 
Ontario Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In a split decision, the Supreme Court of Canada also struck down 
the provisions on the basis that they infringed the young person‟s rights 
under section 7 of the Charter. However, the Court, unanimous on this 
point, found that the applicable principle of fundamental justice was not 
as was found by either the Quebec Court of Appeal or the Ontario Court 
                                                                                                             
15 [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.). 
16 Supra, note 14. 
17 R. v. B. (D.), [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 79 O.R. (3d) 698 (Ont. C.A.). 
18 Id., at paras. 55, 63. 
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of Appeal, i.e., neither the best interests principle nor the presumption of 
separate treatment. Rather, Abella J. described the principle as the 
entitlement of youth to a “presumption of reduced moral blameworthiness” 
or “culpability” flowing from their heightened vulnerability, lesser 
maturity and reduced capacity for moral judgment.
19
 Justice Rothstein 
for the minority concurred on this point but held that the principle was 
not breached by the legislation.
20
 It should be noted that none of the 
parties to the appeal argued that this was the principle at stake. The 
Appellant Attorney General had argued that it was a principle of 
fundamental justice that any person is entitled to recognition of his or her 
reduced maturity based upon age.
21
 The Respondent, D.B., supported the 
reasoning of the court below.
22
 
IV. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
In rejecting the Quebec Court of Appeal‟s conclusions, the Supreme 
Court (as well as the Court of Appeal) followed the reasoning in 
Canadian Foundation
23
 that applied the following criteria in Malmo-
Levine
24
 for assessing whether a legal principle is a principle of 
fundamental justice: 
(1) It must be a legal principle. 
(2) There must be a consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental 
to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate 
[central to our societal notion of justice]. 
(3) It must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a 
manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, 
liberty or security of the person.
25
 
In Canadian Foundation the Court determined that the principle of 
the best interests of the child failed to pass muster on the aspect of the 
test that required that it be central to our societal notion of justice. It also 
                                                                                                             
19 Supra, note 1, at para. 41. Justice Abella also concluded that the presumption of adult 
sentencing breached another, non-youth justice oriented principle of fundamental justice that the 
Crown must bear the burden of demonstrating the factors that support the need for a harsher 
sentence. This conclusion was disputed by Rothstein J. in his dissent. 
20 Id., at para. 106. 
21 Factum of the Appellant, Attorney General of Ontario, filed in R. v. B. (D.) (June 1, 2007). 
22 Factum of the Respondent, D.B., filed in R. v. B. (D.) (March 23, 2007). 
23 Supra, note 14. 
24 Id.  
25 Supra, note 1, at para. 46. 
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lacked sufficient precision, due to its contextual nature, to meet the test. 
In R. v. B. (D.) the Court also rejected the notion that the presumption of 
a separate youth justice system was such a principle and instead reasoned 
that it was the rationale for such a system that was in fact the guiding 
legal principle. 
In reaching the latter conclusion, Abella J. notes that “it is widely 
acknowledged that age plays a role in the development of judgment and 
moral sophistication”.26 She cites legal scholars on sentencing and youth 
justice, as well as at least one text that summarizes the social science 
literature, for the “reality of reduced moral culpability on the part of 
young people”.27 Thus the principle she enunciates, the presumption of 
diminished moral blameworthiness, meets the second prong of the 
Malmo-Levine test according to her reasoning: 
The preceding confirms, in my view, that a broad consensus reflecting 
society‟s values and interests exists, namely that the principle of a 
presumption of diminished moral culpability in young persons is 
fundamental to our notions of how a fair legal system ought to 
operate.
28
 
Her comments in respect of the third prong of the test illustrate the 
difficulty with the Malmo-Levine test which presumes more precision in 
general legal principles than is often demonstrable. Justice Abella‟s 
reasoning here comes very close to saying that a principle is deemed to 
be sufficiently precise simply because the Court says so: 
The third criterion for recognition as a principle of fundamental justice 
is that the principle be identified with sufficient precision to yield a 
manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, 
liberty or security of the person. This is not a difficult criterion to 
satisfy in this case. The principle that young people are entitled to a 
presumption of diminished moral culpability throughout any proceedings 
against them, including during sentencing, is readily administrable and 
sufficiently precise to yield a manageable standard. It is, in fact, a 
principle that has been administered and applied to proceedings against 
young people for decades in this country.
29
 
Justice Rothstein in his dissenting reasons, in fact, reveals the lack of 
precision inherent in the principle. Although he concurs in the finding 
                                                                                                             
26 Id., at para. 62. 
27 Id., at paras. 62-67. 
28 Id., at para. 68. 
29 Id., at para. 69. 
(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)  DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF ADOLESCENTS 241 
that a presumption of reduced moral blameworthiness of adolescents is a 
principle of fundamental justice, he takes issue with the meaning he 
attributes to the principle within the majority‟s reasoning. He asks, “is a 
presumption of lower sentences for young offenders a necessary attribute 
of this presumption of reduced moral blameworthiness?”30 While he does 
not state that the majority would go this far, he does interpret Abella J.‟s 
reasoning as dictating a presumption of “youth sentences”. Finding that 
this is the problematic conclusion of Abella J.‟s reasoning, he would find 
otherwise and hold that affording the young person the ability to apply 
for a youth sentence is sufficient to meet the presumption. 
V. WHAT DOES REDUCED MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS MEAN? 
Moral blameworthiness is considered an essential element of both 
the criminal offence, in respect of the commission of the offence, and the 
quantum of sentence. The Court stated in R. v. Ruzic, a case that 
examined the defence of duress, that it has “recognized on a number of 
occasions that „moral blameworthiness‟ is an essential component of 
criminal liability”.31 However, in commenting on the concept of “blame-
lessness”, the Court expressed caution in introducing such uncertainty 
into the law: 
The undefinable and potentially far-reaching nature of the concept of 
moral blamelessness prevents us from recognizing its relevance beyond 
an initial finding of guilt in the context of s. 7 of the Charter. Holding 
otherwise would inject an unacceptable degree of uncertainty into the 
law. It would not be consistent with our duty to consider as “principles 
of fundamental justice” only those concepts which are constrained and 
capable of being defined with reasonable precision. I would therefore 
reject this basis for finding that it is a principle of fundamental justice 
that morally involuntary acts should not be punished.
32
 
Professor Martha Shaffer, cited in R. v. Ruzic, noted the ambiguity 
surrounding the notion of moral blameworthiness in an article focusing 
on moral involuntariness and the defence of duress, stating: 
While the Supreme Court of Canada has invoked the concept liberally 
throughout its s. 7 jurisprudence, it has never discussed the meaning of 
moral blameworthiness in any comprehensive way. As a result, it is not 
                                                                                                             
30 Id., at para. 126. 
31 [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 32 (S.C.C.). 
32 Id., at para. 41. 
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clear whether the court views moral blameworthiness as restricted to 
questions regarding the fault element of offences — generally whether 
the mental element of an offence is constitutionally adequate — or 
whether the court‟s conception would also encompass issues arising 
after the constitutionally required fault element is determined.
33
 
Regardless of the ambiguity expressed in these contexts, moral 
blameworthiness is most often considered to play a part in the sentencing 
stage of proceedings. As Lamer C.J.C. held in R. v. M. (C.A.): “It is a 
well-established tenet of our criminal law that the quantum of sentence 
imposed should be broadly commensurate with the gravity of the offence 
committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.”34 In Malmo-
Levine, Arbour J., in dissent, states, “It is a fundamental principle of 
sentencing that both the severity of the offence and the moral blame-
worthiness of the offender should dictate the quantum of sentence.”35 
Thus, it follows that a presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness 
must equate with a presumption of a lesser sentence. However, even on 
this point Abella J. equivocates somewhat in R. v. B. (D.) and states, 
“[t]his does not make young persons less accountable for serious 
offences; it makes them differently accountable.”36  
VI. SOCIAL SCIENCE SUPPORT FOR THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF 
REDUCED MORAL CULPABILITY 
Although the concept of moral blameworthiness within the criminal 
law context is clearly part of the legal principles governing sentencing, as 
set out above, the principle, as defined by Abella J., of a “presumption of 
diminished moral culpability” has attributes of a psychological conclusion 
specifically applicable to adolescence. Arguably it is only supportable to 
the extent that the science of developmental psychology supports it. If 
the studies were to show that all adolescents reach rational and 
psychosocial maturity by age 13, for example, the presumption would 
fail. Without stating so clearly, the Court takes judicial notice precisely 
of the fact that the evidence supports the presumption and, in effect, 
helps to define it. Citing primarily legal commentators, Abella J. draws 
her conclusions as to age and the development of judgment and moral 
                                                                                                             
33 Martha Shaffer, “Scrutinizing Duress: The Constitutional Validity of Section 17 of the 
Criminal Code” (1998) 40 C.L.Q. 444, at 453-54. 
34 [1996] S.C.J. No. 28, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 40 (S.C.C.). 
35 Supra, note 14, at para. 234. 
36 Supra, note 1, at para. 93 (emphasis in original). 
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sophistication; but as articulated by the majority of the Court the 
conclusions could also be considered somewhat of a simplification of the 
developmental psychology that underlies the justification for a separate 
youth justice system with enhanced protections and different approaches 
at various stages, the principle rejected by the Court.  
There are a number of evidentiary aspects to the Court‟s ruling that 
warrant discussion of the courts‟ handling of complex social science 
evidence in cases such as this one with significant social policy 
implications. While it may be that the literature is now sufficiently robust 
to unequivocally support the conclusions drawn by the Supreme Court in 
respect of the blameworthiness of adolescents, the factual foundation that 
would normally be part of the Court record is in essence third hand 
conclusions of which the Court takes judicial notice. No evidence was 
called at any stage of the proceedings in R. v. B. (D.) as to the current 
social science evidence on moral development or adolescent developmental 
psychology. The evidence is primarily summarized by Nicholas Bala in 
Youth Criminal Justice Law,
37
 cited heavily in the majority judgment. 
Some of the attributes of adolescence that certainly impact on judgment 
are accepted without controversy: heightened vulnerability, tendency to 
act on impulse, importance of peer influence and tendency to engage in 
risky behaviour. However, there is less agreement in the literature in 
respect of the Court‟s conclusion in respect of the capacity for moral 
judgment. The issue is summarized by Doob and Cesaroni, in Responding 
to Youth Crime in Canada, one of the few such authorities cited by the 
Court: 
One of the mistakes people sometimes make is to assume that the 
reason we have a separate justice system for youths is that there is a 
belief that youth do not understand that certain acts are morally wrong. 
This does not seem to be the case. Very young children are likely to be 
able to understand that certain acts are wrong. Few would suggest that 
ordinary 11- or 17-year-olds do not understand, almost as well as adults 
understand, that either taking something from a store without paying 
for it, or stabbing someone, is not morally acceptable.
38
 
The social science research suggests more subtle differences between 
adolescents and adults that nonetheless supports significantly different 
                                                                                                             
37 Nicholas Bala, Youth Criminal Justice Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) [hereinafter 
“Bala, Youth Criminal Justice Law”].  
38 Anthony Doob & Carla Cesaroni, Responding to Youth Crime in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2004), at 34 [hereinafter “Doob & Cesaroni”]. 
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responses to criminal behaviour. A more comprehensive review of the 
literature was undertaken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v. 
Simmons,
39
 a case not cited in R. v. B. (D.) but clearly touching on the 
same conclusions regarding the nature of adolescence and the imposition 
of adult penalities. The U.S. Supreme Court relied heavily on the 
research conducted by Steinberg and others in its decision striking down 
the death penalty for offenders under the age of 18. A significant amount 
of research material was provided by way of Brandeis briefs from amicus 
curiae such as the American Psychological Association and the 
American Psychiatric Association, among numerous others. In a paper 
that surveys the social science as of 2003, and was relied upon by the 
Court, Steinberg and Scott concluded: 
Thus, there is good reason to believe that adolescents, as compared to 
adults, are more susceptible to influence, less future oriented, less risk 
averse, and less able to manage their impulses and behavior, and that 
these differences likely have a neurobiological basis. The important 
conclusion for our purposes is that juveniles may have diminished 
decision-making capacity compared with adults because of differences 
in psychosocial capacities that are likely biological in origin.
40
 
Additional research also supports differential treatment in other 
aspects of the youth criminal justice system beyond just sentencing. For 
example, research supports the view that the tendency toward 
experimentation with risky behaviour during adolescence and the 
development of identity through the adolescent years support the 
argument that the labelling of young persons as criminal into their 
adulthood is unwarranted given the often transitory nature of adolescent 
offending behaviour.
41
 Doob and Cesaroni have noted that the research 
demonstrating the lack of understanding that young people generally 
have as to the nature of rights, the consequences of waiving their legal 
rights, including their right to counsel, as well as their understanding of 
the trial process, suggest that “we cannot assume that young people have 
sufficient knowledge of the legal system and the criminal law provisions 
that govern proceedings in the youth justice system to fully and freely 
participate in criminal proceedings against them”.42 It is these more 
                                                                                                             
39 543 U.S. 551, 161 L.Ed. 2d 1 (2005). 
40 L. Steinberg & E. Scott, “Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty” 58(12) American 
Psychologist 1009-1018, at 1013. 
41 Id., at 1014. 
42 Doob & Cesaroni, supra, note 38, at 36-40. 
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complex differences that suggest the need for a separate youth justice 
system, not just separate youth sentences.
43
 
Arguably, the case of R. v. L. (S.J.)
44
 moves in that direction in the 
reasoning of the majority as to the legality of joint trials of co-accused 
adults and young persons. Justice Deschamps, this time speaking for the 
majority (although she concurred with Rothstein J. in R. v. B. (D.)), 
states: 
Finally — and this comment concerns the overall approach to youth 
justice — the effect of the objectives of the Act is that the judge is 
asked to favour rehabilitation, reintegration and the principle of a fair 
and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the young 
person‟s reduced level of maturity. As for the adult criminal justice 
system, it places greater emphasis on punishment. There is no doubt 
that how the judge conducts the trial will reflect these different 
objectives. It would be much more difficult to maintain an approach 
favourable to a young person if he or she were being tried together with 
an adult, and the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness to 
which the young person is entitled could be undermined as a result.
45
 
Thus, her reasoning seems to suggest that the principle of diminished 
moral blameworthiness applies to more than simply the sentencing of 
young people and affects the entire procedural approach to youth 
criminal justice. This is precisely the conclusion that split the Court in R. 
v. B. (D.), which really turned on the implications of the principle. Those 
implications are at the heart of the second criterion in the Malmo-Levine 
test which examines the social acceptance of the principle in the way it 
affects how the legal system “ought fairly to operate”.46 
VII. SOCIETAL CONSENSUS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF  
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
Despite ostensibly agreeing on the applicable principle of fundamental 
justice, the majority and the minority disagree as to the societal consensus 
on the appropriate response to youth crime. The differences lie in their 
respective approaches to determining societal consensus for the principle 
and to balancing competing interests within the section 7 analysis. Once 
                                                                                                             
43 Anjeev Anand, “Catalyst for Change: The History of Canadian Juvenile Justice Reform” 
(1999) 24 Queen‟s L.J. 515-59, at para. 92 [hereinafter “Anand”]. 
44 [2009] S.C.J. No. 14, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 426 (S.C.C.). 
45 Id., at para. 75. 
46 Supra, note 14, at para. 113. 
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again the Court‟s use of evidence outside of the record before the Court 
as well as a somewhat selective approach to the analysis of the legislative 
history demonstrate the complexities of the issues in the section 7 
analysis and, arguably, the limitations of the Malmo-Levine test, 
particularly in respect of its requirement of “precision”. 
Justice Rothstein points to public calls for harsher penalties for 
young people as an indication that societal consensus does not agree with 
the conclusions reached by the majority. Citing Doob and Cesaroni, he 
notes that “studies on public perceptions of youth crime suggest that the 
prevailing views of the public are that youth crime is rising, particularly 
violent youth crime, and that young offenders are handled too leniently 
by youth justice courts.”47 However, he never addresses the basic 
problem with accepting this as societal consensus: the opinions are based 
on erroneous assumptions of the facts as to the impact of rehabilitation 
and the youth crime rate, and the studies cited suggest more complex 
attitudes and assumptions at play, often related to the manner in which 
youth crime is covered in the media.
48
 If misleading media coverage can 
skew public sentiment such as to negate by popular opinion a principle of 
fundamental justice, does this not call into question the very concept of 
the rule of law? 
Justice Abella places greater emphasis on the legislative history, 
legal precedent, academic commentary and Canada‟s international 
obligations to support her conclusion of a broad consensus, essentially 
ignoring public sentiment. Justice Rothstein accurately identifies points 
in her reasoning of selective analysis of the legislative history in respect 
of the treatment of some young people as adults, whereas his own 
selective analysis of juvenile justice developments in Canada suggests a 
rejection of the child welfare approach of early delinquency legislation in 
favour of more accountability by young people. However, it ignores the 
fact that the more recent legislation balances this accountability with a 
more rights-based approach that was found wanting in the Juvenile 
Delinquents Act, which would not likely have withstood Charter scrutiny.
49
 
The differences between the two decisions lay as much in the 
definition of the principle of fundamental justice at play, as in how the 
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Court should balance the respective rights of the individual young person 
with the state interest in protecting the public. Justice Abella‟s judgment 
signals a willingness to do the balancing under section 1 of the Charter, 
an approach that is consistent with the line of reverse onus cases from the 
early 1990s.
50
 Justice Rothstein clearly takes the opposite approach, 
finding that the impugned provisions do not infringe the principle of 
fundamental justice enunciated when balanced against the societal 
interest of public safety.
51
 
The case is clearly at the fulcrum of the incredible tension in youth 
justice policy in this country, between political decisions influenced by 
headlines fuelling public sentiments toward retribution and policy 
approaches with a rehabilitation focus based upon research and consultation 
with experts. The YCJA was carefully designed to attempt to balance the 
two competing interests, but according to the majority of the Supreme 
Court, weighed too favourably on the side of those seeking a more 
retributive form of justice. The case illustrates, in its divisive judgment, 
society‟s ambivalent views about adolescents. On the one hand, the 
public tends to want to limit rights based upon assumptions as to 
decision-making capacity, assumptions that seem to have considerable 
scientific support, and on the other hand, to bring the full range of adult 
responsibility to bear when young people commit crimes. The Court‟s 
subsequent decision in C. (A.) v. Manitoba, again a split decision 
focusing on adolescent development, is arguably consistent in its 
ambivalent approach to adolescent autonomy.  
VIII. C. (A.) V. MANITOBA (DIRECTOR OF CHILD AND  
FAMILY SERVICES) 
In its long-awaited decision, C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child 
and Family Services),
52
 Abella J. for the majority of the Supreme Court 
rendered a judgment that is consistent with R. v. B. (D.) in its 
“constitutionalization” of adolescence. The presumption of reduced 
capacity for judgment, in this case as it relates to medical decision-
making, is preserved by the majority‟s finding that such a presumption 
does not infringe a child‟s rights under section 7 to liberty and security of 
the person. The “constitutionalization” of adolescence in effect means 
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protecting young people by not treating them as adults and thereby not 
affording them adult rights under the Charter. 
A.C. had challenged the Manitoba legislation that had been 
interpreted by the courts below as providing courts with the power to 
order medical treatment contrary to her wishes. A.C., a mature 14-year-
old girl, asserted her rights under the Charter to make a religiously 
motivated medical decision to refuse a blood transfusion. The treatment 
was deemed by the doctors and held by the lower court to be medically 
necessary as there was “immediate danger as the minutes go by, if not 
[of] death, then certainly [of] serious damage”.53 A.C. suffered from 
Crohn‟s disease which caused intestinal bleeding. She had arrived four 
days prior to the court hearing at the emergency department of the 
hospital, where she was initially stabilized without the need for a 
transfusion, but through the night of the third day in the hospital she 
appeared to have suffered another bleed and was in serious need of 
hemoglobin. She was apprehended and an emergency protection hearing 
was convened wherein the Director of Child and Family Services sought 
an order under the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act
54
 for an 
order authorizing qualified medical personnel to administer blood 
transfusions to A.C. as deemed necessary by the attending physician, 
without her consent or that of her parents. It had been argued by 
Manitoba that her consent was irrelevant to the court proceedings as the 
legislation permitted the court to order the treatment regardless of her 
capacity. 
The decision of the majority finds that there were no breaches of 
A.C.‟s Charter rights under section 2(a), section 7 or section 15.55 
However, the fact that A.C. was found to have capacity to make the 
decision by psychiatrists who had assessed her, and the argument that 
adolescents demonstrate varying degrees of maturity and capacity in 
respect of these types of decisions, could not be ignored by the Court. 
Instead, Abella J., for the majority, reads into the legal test of the best 
interests of the child, the obligation to take into account the child‟s views 
and wishes in accordance with his or her evolving capacities. The test is 
to be interpreted so that a young person is afforded a degree of bodily 
autonomy and integrity commensurate with his or her ability to exercise 
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mature, independent judgment. In a thoughtful decision that canvasses 
much of the literature in regard to adolescent decision-making capacity 
(a significant amount of which was not pleaded by the parties),
56
 Abella 
J. grapples with the dilemma presented by a mature young woman who 
wishes to make what is presumed to be a bad decision.  
IX. ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE IN  
C. (A.) V. MANITOBA 
The principle of fundamental justice against which the deprivation of 
A.C.‟s liberty and security of the person is measured is that laws should 
not be arbitrary. Justice Abella unequivocally states “given the 
significance we attach to bodily integrity, it would be arbitary to assume 
that no one under the age of 16 has capacity to make medical treatment 
decisions”.57 As in R. v. B. (D.) the social science literature is central to 
Abella J.‟s analysis of the purported arbitrariness of the law. However, in 
this case, the Court took it upon itself to conduct an independent review 
of the literature. Under the subheading of academic literature Abella J. 
quotes extensively from both commentary and studies into the nature of 
decision-making by adolescents and the ability of health practitioners to 
assess capacity. Arguably, this goes far beyond the judicial notice taken 
of the unique circumstances of adolescence in R. v. B. (D.). 
Despite any concerns one might have about the majority‟s independent 
fact-finding mission, the conclusions drawn are not particularly controversial 
in that they acknowledge the complexity of assessing capacity in 
adolescents, thereby requiring an individualized approach: 
Clearly the factors that may affect an adolescent‟s ability to exercise 
independent, mature judgment in making maximally autonomous 
choices are numerous, complex, and difficult to enumerate with any 
precision. They include “the individual physical, intellectual and 
psychological maturity of the minor, the minor‟s lifestyle … [and] the 
nature of the parent-child relationship” (Manitoba Law Reform 
Commission, Minors’ Consent to Health Care, p. 32). While it may be 
relatively easy to test cognitive competence alone, as the social 
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scientific literature shows, it will inevitably be a far more challenging 
exercise to evaluate the impact of these other types of factors.
58
 
Ultimately, Abella J. finds that a presumption against capacity for those 
under 16 years of age, with a positive obligation to consider the views 
and wishes of a particular young person, on a sliding scale of scrutiny 
that encompasses both the maturity of the adolescent and the seriousness 
of the decision,
59
 is not an arbitrary violation of the young person‟s 
liberty or security of the person. Chief Justice McLachlin, concurring in 
the decision, goes further in her support of the law in question and 
suggests that using age as a proxy for independence does not infringe the 
substantive principle of fundamental justice against arbitrariness. In her 
reasons she refers to the majority‟s decision in R. v. B. (D.) as 
recognizing “as a principle of fundamental justice that young persons 
must generally be treated differently from adults by virtue of their 
„reduced maturity and moral capacity‟”,60an arguably broader take on the 
majority‟s decision in that case and precisely the principle enunciated by 
the Court of Appeal and rejected by the Supreme Court as insufficiently 
precise. The criterion for precision in the identification of the principle is 
thus shown to be more malleable than one might expect. However 
previous decisions have acknowledged flexibility in the interpretation of 
other fundamental principles. For example, Iacobucci J. in R. v. S. (R.J.) 
stated that “the principle against self-incrimination may mean different 
things at different times and in different contexts”.61 
X. CONCLUSION 
As in R. v. S. (R.J.), the principle of a presumption of diminished 
moral culpability has already been shown to have a different meaning, 
albeit at the same time and in the same context. The blame may be 
attributed to the Court‟s reliance upon the social science evidence to 
attempt to establish societal consensus for too narrow a principle. A more 
comprehensive review of the literature demonstrates the need for 
differential treatment in many aspects of the criminal justice system. 
Similar evidence appears to ground the Court‟s section 7 analysis in 
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C. (A.) v. Manitoba,
62
 which in essence, reinterprets the legislation to 
maintain its constitutionality. 
Arguably the two cases, read together with the Court‟s earlier 
decision in Canadian Foundation,
63
 suggest an entirely distinct reading 
of Charter rights for children, a reading that eschews autonomy and 
establishes paternalism as a principle of fundamental justice. In R. v. B. 
(D.),
64
 the principle is narrowly construed as a presumption of reduced 
moral blameworthiness, which prevents the opposite presumption of 
harsher adult sentences. In C. (A.) v. Manitoba, the principle against 
arbitrariness is held not to be infringed where there is a presumption of 
reduced capacity for decision-making that nonetheless must consider the 
young person‟s best interests. In both instances, there is the presumption 
against adult-like treatment rebuttable by the individual circumstances of 
the adolescent in question, including the nature of the crime committed 
or the seriousness of the medical decision to be made. However, it is the 
Chief Justice‟s reinterpretation of the principle articulated in R. v. B. 
(D.), along with Deschamps J.‟s similar expansive interpretation in R. 
v. L. (S.J.),
65
 that together support Professor Bala‟s concept of the 
“constitutionalization of adolescence”.66 
Child rights advocates should be wary lest this classification of 
adolescents as “other” lead to the erosion of their entitlement to other 
rights under the Charter. As Binnie J. notes in his dissenting opinion, 
“the rights under s. 2(a) of the Charter (religious freedom) and s. 7 
(liberty and security of the person) are given to everyone, including 
individuals under 16 years old”.67 This tendency is clear in the Court‟s 
interpretation of the enumerated ground of age under section 15 of the 
Charter in both Canadian Foundation, where the presumed different 
capacities of younger children led to the conclusion that the law that 
excuses assaults on them does not infringe their right to equality, and in 
C. (A.) v. Manitoba, where the majority of the Court found no such 
infringement because the legislation required a determination of their 
best interests which permits them to demonstrate their maturity. 
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